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THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE ("DIAC")
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
WOLFGANG FIKENTSCHER*
INTRODUCTION: THE LEGAL POLICY BACKGROUND OF DIAC
I am grateful that I am permitted to tell a bit about this Draft,
and on the international law of competition in general, against the
background of international technological integration.
Time is ripe for an internationally working system of the laws of
competition on which all agents active in the worldwide marketplace
can rely. It is of no use having national economies and national laws
about national economies, and besides this an international economy
and no international law. So something has to be done to this effect,
and, having the World Trade Organization ("WTO") in place, it would
be strange if this trade organization would not look into the question
of competition.
Like any national law of competition, this coming internationally
working system of law of competition will be composed of two parts.
First, it takes rules against unfair trade practices, such as dumping or
passing off. Then, there have to be rules against restraints of competi-
tion, such as cartels and monopolizing practices.
Therefore, one of the first general issues presented to the WTO
will be this international law of competition, consisting of unfair trade
and restraint of competition inhibitions. Anticipating this still under
the old GATT regime, in 1991, together with eleven friends in the
antitrust field, I formed an "International Antitrust Working Group,"
as we called ourselves, and two years later we presented our draft to
Mr. Sutherland, Director General of GATT.
* Professor of Law, University of Munich, Germany, and Ext. Member, Max-Planck Insti-
tute for Foreign and International Patent, Copyright and Competition Law. The private Interna-
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We decided to formulate a draft law with explanatory comments
and-by majority vote (see section VIII of our Introduction)-not
just limit our activities to the elaboration of some principles. Another
thing we agreed upon right from the beginning in 1991 was that we
would not look to political constraints or feasibility arguments. We
just wanted to work as we are used to working as theorists and practi-
tioners of antitrust. It was teamwork, and everybody contributed to
this result. We promised in the end not to tell anybody who drafted
what. I may say that all the texts went through all the hands, so we
are responsible for the whole draft.
Since my time appears to be more limited than I anticipated when
I prepared this lecture I will confine myself to four topics: (i) some
basic ideas underlying the Draft International Antitrust Code; (ii) five
principles we followed in drafting the DIAC; (iii) a comment on Arti-
cle 6 of the DIAC dealing with the interface of intellectual property
and competition law, since this the subject of our conference; and (iv)
some objections raised during the last two years against the DIAC,
and answers to these objections.
I. UNDERLYING IDEAS
There are two possible approaches to an international antitrust
law. The first approach makes the point that international trade needs
protection not only from restraints through state intervention by tar-
iffs and quotas (and other non-tariff barriers)-this is the classical
field of GATI-but also from private restraints. This "trade ap-
proach," if I may say so, asks for an international antitrust law under
the viewpoint of fostering and protecting international trade and com-
merce. The second approach may be called the "intellectual property
and unfair trade practices approach." It dates back to the history of
the Paris Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention (now Re-
vised Berne Convention) of 1886. The Paris Convention for the pro-
tection of patents and other industrial property contains an Article
l0bis, which was added in 1900 in the Brussels Revision, a provision
outlawing unfair trade practices and obligating all member states,
among them the United States, to provide for the necessary procom-
petitive rules for the international business community. However, the
language of Article l0bis of the Paris Convention does not cover the
law of trade restraints, or antitrust law, the second subfield of the law
of competition. This gap of the Paris Convention has now been open
for ninety-six years.
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There is no dispute today that the law of unfair trade practices,
covered in lObis of the Paris Convention, and the law of trade re-
straints closely interlink. For example, they cannot neatly be sepa-
rated into the fields of predatory pricing, discriminations, boycotts,
dumping, and subsidies.
This linkage is also present among the legal policies behind com-
petition law. The illegitimate profits in terms of the law of unfair
trade practices are drawn from dishonest behavior, such as passing off
or boycotts; the illegitimate profits in antitrust law are gained from
cartels, tyings, or monopoly rents; an agreement in restraint of trade,
let us say by a conference telephone call from business office to busi-
ness office, is nothing which should be honored by higher prices or
assigned quotas. So, the legal policies of unfair trade practices law
and antitrust law are very similar, and this is the reason why both
fields are moving towards each other. Since the legal policies of unfair
trade practices and antitrust law are so closely related, it is surprising
that Article 10bis of the Paris Convention was never used as the basis
for an international antitrust law.
Both approaches, the "trade" and the "competition law" ap-
proach, demonstrate an identical necessity: that an international anti-
trust, not just of conflicts law (with or without extraterritorial effects),
but of a substantive nature is overdue.
In drafting our international antitrust code, we looked to GATT
and to the possibility of a plurilateral agreement. Thus our Draft
could be a candidate for Annex 4 of the WTO.
In Section I of the Introduction of the DIAC we stress the neces-
sity of an international antitrust law in today's economic world. One
of the arguments, which we raised there, concerns the law of
merchants. The law of merchants was developed in history when
merchants came together trading. It could be claimed that it is
enough to have this self-made law of merchants. Then why do we
have to regulate something? Should not the rules of how to compete
be left to the competitors themselves? However, it is well known that
if two are going to make a deal to regulate a conflict among them-
selves, more often than not the outcome of the settlement turns out to
be at the expense of others, of some outsiders who did not participate
in this negotiating under the law of merchants. Within the legal sys-
tem of a nation-state it is the government which, in such circum-
stances, is able and in charge to protect the public or third party
interests-for example those of the consumers. In the international
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arena such government is missing. This was the result of John Jack-
son's fascinating survey. Internationally, the protection of third.party
interests, of outsiders, of the underprivileged, is therefore to be guar-
anteed by international cooperation in antitrust policy and law.
As Judge Wood has said at this Conference: This should be done
in such a way that at least one national government lends its arm to
put into effect the protection of the so far unprotected third party in
the international arena. This party could be the consumer who falls
victim to an international cartel. It could also be a producer who falls
victim to the activities of some powerful chain of stores or suppliers.
We have to look both ways in antitrust law.
The next section discusses the prospects and the usefulness of an
international antitrust law from various points of view: United Na-
tions, American, Japanese, and European Community. We tried there
to anticipate what these nations and regions would think about an in-
ternational antitrust system.
The third section deals with areas of law which we do not cover in
our Draft, for example, dumping, subsidies, illicit payments, corrup-
tion, other unfair trading practices, and consumer protection; to in-
clude them would have surpassed our abilities to finish the Draft Code
within two years.
The fourth section is devoted to the history of international anti-
trust law. This history begins during the war years 1940-1941 with the
Atlantic Charter. It is certainly not yet finished to this very day.
The reasons why we thought that the WTO would be the proper
place for our Draft Code are briefly set forth in section five.
Let me now turn to the five principles of law governing the Draft
Code; they are contained and explained in section six.
II. FIVE PRINCIPLES FOLLOWED IN DRAFTING THE DIAC
Our first principle was not to opt for a uniform law; not to opt for
a "world law;" not to try to repeat the Havana Charter, or the soft law
of the United Nations Restricted Business Code of 1980; but let na-
tional antitrust laws do the job, and let national antitrust laws stay in
their place and take care of the problems which are posed in the inter-
national arena. In this, our view conforms to what Judge Wood pro-
posed. We did not want to create a world law or a uniform law,
comparable, for example, to the Uniform Bills of Exchange and
Check Laws of 1930. We did not aim at an "Esperanto antitrust law."
We wanted to confine ourselves to the application of national law.
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However, it should be equiped-this national law-to deal with inter-
national problems.
And, with this aim in mind we had some easy models to follow:
the Paris Convention of 1883, the Berne Convention of 1886, and
other intellectual property protection treaties. These are international
instruments utilizing national laws for international purposes in a legal
field closely related to the law of competition. Therefore, our idea
was to orient ourselves toward the two "great conventions" of 1883
and 1886 and to follow their techniques.
In this manner, the second principle of the DIAC is taken from
the Paris and Berne conventions. It is the principle of national treat-
ment, which means there should be no discrimination in the treatment
of home firms and enterprises from abroad when it comes to the ap-
plication of national antitrust laws. GATT, as you know, is also based
on this principle. In the present context this means that national and
international competition has to be treated without differentiation.
This amounts to the abolishment of export cartel privileges.
The third principle is also derived from those "great conventions"
of 1883 and 1886. It is the principle of minimum standards. Without
this minimum standards principle there would be merely national law
and national treatment. This would imply that foreigners are sub-
jected to national law in the same way as nationals. However, differ-
ences between the national laws would remain, and this would permit
international discrimination and prevent the establishment of some
equal international standards. So, following the "great conventions,"
we tried to draw up a level of minimum standards, and the DIAC is
basically nothing more then a collection of these minimum standards.
The new term for minimum standards is "consensus wrongs." I
will come back to that when I talk about some objections raised
against the DIAC. In essence, we wanted to regulate the consensus
wrongs, which are antitrust offenses to which everybody can be rea-
sonably expected to be opposed. Hence, the international antitrust
code as we propose it is cast in the form of minimum standards. This
means nations can and will go beyond-widely, if they want to-the
standards of our draft.
You can take from this combination of principles that we were
mainly following the Paris-Berne approach in drafting this concept of
internationalizing national restraint of competition laws. However,
we tried to avail ourselves of the sanction mechanism of GATT; these
1996]
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GATT remedies are easy-to-use sanctions in the modern economic
world, and are already well-tested.
I come now to principle number four. This principle is new and
requires some words of explanation. The three principles mentioned
so far-national law, national treatment, and minimum standards-
are well known instruments of international treaty law. The fourth
principle brings, as far as we can see, something radically new. If we
think of the Paris Convention, or the Revised Berne Convention, the
next principle in line after the three named before would be the prin-
ciple of self-execution. These Conventions are self-executing. How-
ever, we could not rely on a self-executing character of GATT law,
nor of WTO. I will leave aside these difficult problems we talked
about yesterday-whether via the European Union law WTO law
might become binding for the citizens of the European Union. At any
rate this self-executing character of the great conventions has not
been attributed to GATT or, until now, to WTO. Therefore, we were
confronted with the fact that most GATTIWTO contracting parties do
not view these rules as the law of the land.
By consequence, for our Draft Code, we had to look for another
principle, another idea, of similar implementary effect as self-execut-
ing bindingness. We invented a new principle and gave it the name
Principle of International Procedural Initiative ("IPI"). We started
from the idea that there is already an international agency, GATI',
now WTO. This international agency can be entrusted to safeguard
the application of the national laws of antitrust under the mentioned
international conditions. In cases when a member state does not live
up to its own international promises and commitments, hence does
not take its own initiative, distorts its own law, does not want to apply
its own law, or stays behind what the other members of the interna-
tional community are properly expecting from this nation, some inter-
national WTO official from Geneva may knock at the door of the
inactive member state and say: "Would you please reconsider this
case. Let me plead in your agency; let me plead in your courts." Thus,
the WTO antitrust official deserves national standing. But the official
will be bound by national prodecural law. That WTO official will stay
under that national, legally and culturally accepted, antitrust law. IPI
is a merely procedural device-the granting of standing-to the inter-
national authority in national agencies and courts. Therefore, we
called it "the principal of international procedural initiative." It is em-
bodied in Article 19 alinea 2 of the Draft, and it comes down to a very
simple wisdom: in case somebody from outside complains, WTO sees
[Vol. 72:533
THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST CODE
to it that the national laws, on the basis of national treatment and
minimum standards, are applied.
Which brings me to the fifth and last principle. This one is very
simple: the DIAC only refers to transborder cases. Antitrust cases
occur that have elements crossing national borders. We drafted our
text in a way that it only refers to transnational cases. Merely national
cases belong exclusively to national authorities and courts, and no in-
ternational authority would have the right of standing. But trans-
border situations-international antitrust cases-are something for
WTO to take care of.
This is the collection of the DIAC principles-national law, na-
tional treatment, minimum standards, standing of WTO, and only
transborder cases.
I am perusing the remaining sections of the Introduction very
briefly. Some words about section V, which deals with the ideas of
competition and market which we used: we did not follow any theo-
retical concepts. We just took competition as it is understood in the
marketplace. We rejected the competition and market concepts which
I have called the "objective" market idea-that is, a market in square
miles, possibly blown up to the dimensions of a world market, without
paying attention to competitive rivalry. For a concept, we were look-
ing to a market in which there is competitive strategy, for example, in
which advertising is worthwhile. It is the market which is defined by
competitive rivalry, and this means, by two criteria: The agent in the
marketplace, the "owner of the firm," asks himself: "Who is my com-
petitor, whose rival am I?" This is the first criterion. The second cri-
terion is the answer to his question, while considering the other side of
the market: "Whose competition can I use for my own strategies, from
whose competition do I benefit?" So the "subjective market" looks at
the two stages of the market. If you add up these two standards, you
come to a market idea which focuses on the viewpoint of a single en-
terprise, and thus may be called the subjective market concept. It is
quite apart from world market ideas (or "European" or national mar-
ket ideas) as mere geographical notions in which there are no compet-
itive relationships and no alternatives that lead to a rivalry between
the agents in the market place. The rest of the sections of the Intro-




III. INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGICAL INTEGRATION
Third, I was prepared to report on the substantive rules of the
Draft Code. However, as space is short, let me restrict myself to Arti-
cle 6 of the DIAC which deals with the intellectual property issue; that
is, restraints of trade based upon intellectual property rights. Again,
here I have to be brief. When I learned American antitrust, at the
University of Michigan in 1952, my teacher was Professor S. Chester-
field Oppenheim-an unforgettable teacher, to whom I owe a lot.
The link between intellectual property protection and competition law
was one of his favorite areas in teaching and research. He dwelt quite
a bit on this topic, and his guiding idea was, I remember this quite
vividly, that there is a dividing line: On the one side of the line you
have intellectual property claims as exclusive rights. As far as these
go, there cannot be an antitrust violation. However, if you cross this
line you are in the sphere of possible antitrust violations. This was the
dominant opinion at that time. Let us call this the classical contents
theory, or "two-area theory."
Later this developed into a "three-area theory," namely, when
the doctrine of patent misuse arose. According to this doctrine, trans-
gressing the exclusive claim is not necessarily an antitrust violation.
There are cases in which patents are abused irrespective of any anti-
trust offense.
This was the material with which we were confronted in drafting
Article 6. Convinced by a happy thought of one of the members of
our Group, we tried a four-area theory, something new. We started
by saying that there are two different fields of law with two not identi-
cal policies of law-intellectual property protection and antitrust law.
From the outset, these fields are separated, so that there are areas in
which antitrust law applies or does not apply, and there are areas in
which something is protected under the laws of intellectual property
protection or not. If you start from this premise, you will combine the
two areas of the law to create a cross of four fields, and so we called
our theory a "four-area theory."
Let me start with the upper left corner of the cross. Here we are
concerned with situations where intellectual property rights are
granted under the law, and there is no antitrust offense. That is the
first possibility-you stay within the exclusive claim without commit-
ting an antitrust offense. We covered this case in Article 6, section
1(a), and we commented about this in our Comment number 3. For
example, here we listed licensing contracts. There are licensing
[Vol. 72:533
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clauses which are legal, such as the tying of supply, minimum royal-
ties, field restrictions, trademark requirements, confidentiality re-
quirements, information requirements, quality restrictions, clauses
regarding improvement patents, and most favored licensee require-
ments. These are all cases in which the restriction stays within the
exclusive claim, and there is no antitrust offense. You can add to this
list Article 6, section 2 with its possibility of granting exclusive
licenses, which is a very important addition.
Let me move one square field down. Here we are within the in-
tellectual property rights, but outside of the legality standards of anti-
trust. In other words, there is an antitrust offense although the
contractual clause stays within the claim. We have listed two such
cases in Article 6, section 1(b). For example, here belong the abuses
of monopolies which may be connected with the use of intellectual
property rights. This section 1(b) would be applicable to the Magill
case. Patent pools are also mentioned here, by reference to Article 4
of the DIAC.
Let us move up to the right upper field. Here we are concerned
with situations that are not covered by intellectual property rights, and
besides this fact there is no antitrust offense. This covers the doctrine
of patent misuse under U.S. law-for example, the extension of dura-
tion of the patent term in a competitive market, or the trademark
abuse against an older right. In our Draft this third situation is cov-
ered by Article 6, section 1(c).
Next, there remains a fourth area in which we are concerned with
cases in which the restrictive clause under the exclusive intellectual
property claim is not covered by that intellectual property right, how-
ever there is an antitrust offense. Again, this is mentioned in our Arti-
cle 6 section 1(c) indicated by the conditional conjunction "when."
We commented upon this in Comment Number 4, alinea 2, and in
Comment Number 5 to Article 6 where we say that we list two exam-
ples which are not meant to be exhaustive. Example one is an obliga-
tion not to challenge the validity of the licensed rights ("no-challenge
clause"), and example two is an obligation with respect to the licensed
right even though it may have expired. Here we find the extension of
duration with an anticompetitive effect.
Because it is new, I wanted to present this four-area theory to
you. I think the four-area theory takes care of many problems dis-
cussed in this field.
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IV. OBJECTIONS AND REJOINDERS
Let me come to the last section. I have written an article on the
list of objections raised against the DIAC, but it is in German, so I will
just go through the main parts of the list.
There was an objection that the DIAC contains too much theory.
Some said this is "Freiburg thinking," indicating an alleged similarity
to the teaching of the so-called Freiburg School of neo-liberal think-
ing, influential in Germany. I may answer to this that we made a mix
of all kinds of antitrust ideologies-of the good Old English common
law of trade restraints dating back to Edward Coke, and to the old
common law ancillary restraint doctrines. Of course, U.S. antitrust
was observed in its political aspects. Also the Freiburg School teach-
ings, and the United Nations' experiences based on the Restrictive
Business Practices Code of 1980 were given due consideration. But
not only those. We felt quite independent from any theory.
A second objection says there is much too little theory in the
DIAC. We were reproached for having overlooked the teachings of
the Chicago School, and other important theories that lie behind a
sound antitrust philosophy. To my observation as an outsider, Chi-
cago school teachings suffered a severe blow in the Kodak case of
1992 and are no longer so much observed as they used to be. Anyway,
looking to the needs also of small countries we could not follow Chi-
cago teachings. Small countries are especially sensitive against verti-
cal restraints. They suffer much more from vertical restraints in
economy than large countries with big economies. So, as you know,
France, Canada, and Austria are hostile to and have rather strict laws
against vertical restraints. The bigger the economy, the less dangerous
are vertical restraints because one can better replace intrabrand by
interbrand competition. But in a small economy this cannot work as
market access is more difficult. Take, for example, the eastern Lander
in reunited Germany, where vertical restraints in the beverage indus-
try, supermarket chains, and by important brand owners have killed
off large parts of the liberalized and fledgling domestic economy. The
West German tax payer has to pay for this ill-conceived antitrust pol-
icy by huge transfer payments.
The third objection raised against the DIAC was that we should
have regulated fewer details and limited ourselves to principles (this
was also a minority view within the Group). This is the notion that we
should have concentrated on "consensus wrongs." Now, imagine we
were sitting here together and asked to put together the consensus
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wrongs in the antitrust field throughout the world; what would they
be? There would be a basic inhibition of cartels-horizontals-in re-
straint of trade. Second, there would certainly be a control of abusive
distribution systems. Third, there would be some regulation dealing
with the interface of intellectual property protection and restraints of
trade. Fourth, there would be some concentration and merger control
in order to prevent the circumvention of provisions against horizontals
and verticals by merging. Fifth, surely there would be a provision
against abusive monopoly power. Sixth, there would be some mini-
mum procedural rules. This is what I would say are the consensus
wrongs which have to be put together in order to have something in
international antitrust at all. If you look at the DIAC, in essence it
contains little more; the treatment of the consensus wrongs, that is
exactly what we did.
The fourth objection raised against the DIAC again points to the
contrary. It is being argued that we covered too few details, that the
DIAC should have been drafted in more detail in order to give it a
wider scope. Authors associated with the work of the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development miss an introductory
part of the DIAC dealing with definitions. But we followed the Conti-
nental European usage of regulating only the legal relations (see Savi-
gny: Rechtsverhidlnisse), and let them implicitely define the legal terms
used according to the mischiefs a law wants to cure, in order to avoid
the definitory introduction developing a normative life of its own.
Other examples of desired additional details to be included in the
DIAC refer to rules concerning parallel and gray market imports.
However-I cannot go into the details-we covered this (see Article
5, section 3, on contractual restrictions; and Article 6, section 1 (a),
section 2 ("justified"), Comment Number 5, on trademark licenses).
Again, as I have said before, it depends on whether you build up par-
allel import restrictions on a contract system, or on trademarks. Both
sides of the problem are regulated in our Code. Another issue found
missing in the DIAC by some authorities is dumping and subsidies.
However, we expressly excluded this topic from our drafting business
because of its affinity to unfair trade practices law (see Part III). I
may end by saying that we quite deliberately made extensive use of
the rule of reason, the English common law defense in restrictive busi-
ness practices law, in order to cover many situations that cannot be
regulated in detail.
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